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"Life isn't fair to central bankers in developing countries. Liberalise
your economy, encourage foreign investment and before you know
it, you're in trouble. Capital from abroad crashes onto your shores
with the unforeseen force of a tsunami, and the resulting flood of
money thrcatens rising inflation. Ifyou're not careful, your reputation
washes away in the undertow" (Far Eastern Economic Review, 10
November '1994). The Economist's latest edition also devoted an article
to the same topic. It compares the performance of Latin American
countries, represented by Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Mexico, and
Asian countries, represented by h_donesia, Malaysia and Thailand,
in managing capital inflows. Earlier, the IMF published an article
written by Schadler et al. (1993) which reviews the experiences of six
countries, namely, Chile, Colombia, Egypt, Mexico, Spain and
Thailand, that have had recent surges in capital inflows. At about the
same time, the World Bank circulated a discussion paper entitled
"Portfolio Investment in Developing Countries" edited by Claessens
and Gooptu which put together several articles presented in a
conference in 1993 that examine the issues, trends and policy
implications for developing countries of portfolio capital inflows. The
ADB's Asian Development Review (Vol. 11, No. 1, 1993) devoted one
issue to the topic of foreign direct investments and portfolio
investment in Asian and Pacific economies.
*This is part of the PIDS Review and Outlook of the Philippine Economy (PROPE)
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These are just a few examples of popular articles and in-depth
studies that try to bring to the attention of the general public the
opportunities (e.g., relaxation of capital constraint) and problems
(e.g., increased inflationary pressure, real exchange rate appreciation,
deterioration in the current account) associated with surges in foreign
capital recently experienced by newly opened economies of
developing countries. Indeed, capital inflows can be likened to a pill
that can cure a particular disease but produces some side-effects which;
if not immediately contained, can kill the patient.
The main message of the existing studies on capital inflows is
clear: A country cannot claim success with its liberalization program
when foreign capital starts coming in; only when it is able to minimize
the destabilizing effects and maximize the positive effects of capital
inflows on investment and growth can it claim unqualified success.
The Philippines is one of the countries in Southeast Asia that has
recently experienced sm'ges in capital inflows. As a latecomer in this
area, it has the advantage of having drawn lessons fi'om the experience
of Latin American and Asian countries which encountered surges in
capital inflows much ear!ier, thus avoiding the undesirable effects of
such inflows that threaten economic stability.
The next section provides a backgroUnd of the magnitude and
characteristics of capital flows to developing economies and discusses
some issues, associated with such flows. The third section analyzes the
trends, causes and policy implications of surgesin foreign exchange
inflows in the Philippines during the period 1986-1994, The last
section concludes the stndy. The main conclusion that can be drawn
from the results of the analysis is that the management of surges in
capital inflows in the Philippines still leaves much to be desired. In
particular, full sterilization by the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP)
to meet certain monetary targets under the International Monetary
Fund (IMF)-sponsored stabilization program deprived the country
of the chance to exact more benefits in terms of higher investment
and growth from the foreign exchange inflows.LAMBERTE: MANAGING SURGES IN CAPITAL INFLOWS 45
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SURGES IN FOREIGN CAPITAL
TO DEVELOPING ECONOMIES
If unrestricted, capital normally goes to where returns are highest..It
may leave the area for awhile when disturbances occur, but it always
comes back once everything settles. Interestingly, capital may come
and go in various forms. In the 1970s, huge amounts of petrodollars
were recycled to developing economies by banks in the form of loans.
This partly relaxed the capital constraint faced by developing
countries. Unfortunately, an unprecedented world debt crisis struck
in the early 1980s, resulting in a slowdown in bank lending to
developing countries. When the world debt crisis settled toward the
second half of the 1980s, capital went back to some developing
countries, particularly those that have liberalized their economies,
this time largely in the form of portfolio investments. According to
Howell (1993), this phenomenon is not new. Toward the late 19th
century, "funds left the mature markets of Europe in search of higher
returns in the new, emerging world of the Americas and Asia-Pacific."
He hypothesizes that the world is presently undergoing one phase of
an eight-phase capital flow cycle.
1. ".. the earliest stage of economic development (phase 1) is likely to attrac_ public
or private sector bond finance or high-risk equity finance from foreign investors;
this, in turn, might precipitate subsequent inflows of direct investment (phase 2)
and banking capital (phase 3)- Next, econotnic 'take-off' is likely to attract increasing
amounts of portfolio equity capital (phase a,), and may involve local firms listing
their securities in foreign stock markets.
"....Increasing economic development will raise levels of wealth and may lead
to high net-worth individuals (for example, successful entrepreneurs) investing in
toreign security ntarkets (phase 6), and, second, foreign lending by banks (phase
7). The final phase of net capital outflow is dominated by the large pension, insurance
and mutual ftmds that characterize late capitalism (phase 8)" (p. 80).46 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Portfolio flows to developing countries grew geometrically in the
last five years, from US$7.5 billion in 1989 to US$55.8 billion in 1993.
A large chunk of the portfolio flows went to Latin America and the
Caribbean and East Asia and Pacific countries (Table 1). Indeed, the
magnitude and rapid growth of such flows cannot escape the attention
of both the public and private sectors.
As the saying goes: "It takes two to tango." The portfolio flows
have been facilitated by certain developments in both developing
and developed countries. Toward the second half of the 1980s, many
developing countries started to substantially liberalize their
economies. In particular, regulations on foreign investment, capital
market and foreign exchange market have been relaxed. In addition,
a number of large, highly profitable government corporations in
developing economies were privatized. At the same time,
macroeconomic management in developing countries considerably
improved, providing a good environment for stable growth, which is
very important to foreign investors. The refornls have been regarded
to be credible by both local and foreign investors. For highly indebted
countries, the decline in international interest rates and successful
Table 1
PORTFOLIO FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, BY REGION
(In US$ billion)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993p
East Asia and Pacific 2.88 3.14 4.04 10,00 15.92
Europe and Central Asia 2.30 1.91 0.80 5.17 9.22
Latin America and the Caribbean 1.39 3.77 14.96 20.47 27.20
Global investment funds 0.08 0,04 0.25 0.14 2.64
Other regions 0.86 0.47 0,22 0.93 0.82
All developing countries 7.52 9.33 20.27 36.71 55.79
P = projected
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restructuring programs greatly eased their burden in servicing
external debt, and the savings derived therefrom were used to finance
the adjustment.
The liberalization and the return to positive growth of the
economies of developing countries have provided fund managers in
developed countries with some opportunity to diversify further their
portfolio. This international diversification of portfolio has been
facilitated partly by recent regulatory changes in developed
economies. In the US, for instance, the change in standards for
corporate accounting in 1985 encouraged corporations to diversify
the risk of exposure of their pension funds. Likewise, Canada, Japan
and several European countries relaxed restrictions on international
investing by pension funds to increase returns on their portfolios to
cover partly unfunded liabilities. This occurred at a time when interest
rates on fixed-income instruments in developed economies were
falling and were far less than those being offered by newly opened
economies. Also, price-earnings ratios were generally low in newly
opened markets, suggesting the existence of unexploited profit
opportunities. As Table 2 shows, price-earning ratios of 11 emerging
markets increased more than those of New York between1986 and
1991, indicating that capital surplus countries wasted no time in
investing in emerging markets to capture some of those unexploited
profit opportunities.
Results of empirical studies confirm the benefits expected from
international diversification of portfolio. With regard to investment
in stocks, for instance, Greenwood (1993) estimated that "with a 60
percent U.S. and 40 percent Far East ex_Japan portfolio, returns can
be increased by nearly 1.5 percent per annum for the same level of
risk, or alternatively, with an 80 percent U.S. and 20 percent Far East
ex-Japan portfolio, returns can be raised by 0.75 percent per annum
while risk can be reduced."48 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
Table 2
MARKET PRICE-EARNINGS RATIOS, 1986-1991
1986 1987 1588 1989 1990 1991 1991/
1986
Emerging Markets
Argentina 15,99 3,76 11,30 22,14 3,11 38.89 2.43
Brazil 4.24 15.38 7,95 8.30 5.34 7.65 1.80
Chile 5.27 5.00 4.40 5.82 8,86 17.38 3,30
Colombia 8.26 11.63 8.75 6.96 10,66 26,08 3.16
Greece -- 30.54 10.59 24.30 26.23 10,43 0.34*
India 18.02 22.05 21,51 18.34 20.59 13.85 0.77
Indonesia .... 30,84 26.66
Jordan 12.94 12.76 17,30 14.93 8,15 10.62 0.82
Korea 25,66 21.70 39.51 38.57 21,48 17.57 0.68
Malaysia 32.72 30.74 24.14 30.75 23.01 14.56 0,44
Mexico 10.52 6.23 5.04 10,66 13.20 24.36 2.32
Nigeria 5.84 4.94 6.07 6.99 7.01 9.74 1.67
Pakistan 8.22 6.85 9,37 8.44 8.53 23.87 2.90
Philippines 4.40 8.90 9.92 18.50 24.51 16,23 3,69
Portugal 24,81 27.23 26,50 21,42 15.47 18.91 0.76
Taiwan 12,00 13.01 40.23 51.17 44.41 14.50 1.21
Thailand 12.46 10.51 12.62 23.07 10.90 17,16 1.38
Turkey -- 19.78 2,62 17.64 22.50 21.60 1.09"*
VenezueLa 9.43 16.91 11.45 6.44 29.31 30.50 3.23
Zimbabwe 4.20 7.04 4.24 7,00 12.01 8.35 1.99
Developed Markets
New York 16.77 15.41 12.19 14,70 15.19 21.85 1.30
Tokyo 47.30 58.30 58.40 70.60 39.80 37.80 0.80
* For Greece and Turkey, ratio is 1991/1987.
** The price-earning ratio is the ratio of end-of-month price to trailing.
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The characteristics of the recent capital flows to developing
economies are different from those in the 1970s. First, funds for the
recent capital flows come from various institutional investors (pension
funds, mutual funds, insurance companies, etc.) and high net-worth
individuals, whereas in the 1970s, the capital flows were provided
mostly by afew banks. Greater diversification of the sources of capital
reduces the risk of simulated slow-down or withdrawal of foreign
capital. Second, the portfolio flows go to the developing countries in
various forms, such as debt instruments (bonds, commercial papers,
certificates of deposits), direct equity investment, deposit receipts and
country funds, whereas in the 1970s, most of the capital flows were in
the form of bank loans. Although debt instruments dominate, other
forms of portfolio investments are by no means insignificant (Table
3). Third, the recent capital flows are being channelled to private
borrowers that are subject to market discipline, whereas in the 1970s,
most of the loans went to the public sector. It is therefore to be
expected that foreign capital will be used more efficiently by capital-
receiving countries. Fourth, with portfolio investments, risk is shared
between capital providers and users, unlike in the 1970s when most
of the risks were shifted to borrowers.
Table 3
PORTFOLIO FLOWS TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, BY INSTRUMENT
(In US$ Billion)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1998p
Bonds, CPs and CDs 4.0 5.5 12.7 2 3.7 42.6
Direct equity investment 1.3 0.8 1.5 5.8 3.2
Deposit receipts 0.0 0.1 4.9 5.9 7.3
Country funds 2.2 2.9 1.2 1.3 2,7
Total 7.5 9.3 20.3 36.7 55,8
P = projected
Source:Claessensand Gooptu(1994).50 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
One issue that has been raised is whether the portfolio inflows to
developing countries will continue in the future. This depends on
the growth in assets of major markets, which partly determines the
institutional investors' growth in nondomestic investment, and the
sustainability of the economic growth of capital-receiving countries, e
Many analysts are optimistic about the growth in assets of major
markets. Davanzo and Katz (1992) estimated that pension assets in
major markets will grow by about 10 percent per annum between
1990 and 2000, with Japan and Continental Europe leading the pack
(Table 4). Institutional investors have just started investing in
emerging markets, which could still be increased in the near fi_ture.
Agtmael (1993) pointed out that emerging markets are still
underweighted by most investors. They account for only 0.1 percent
of institutional funds, well below the 7 percent weight of their market
capitalization within world markets and the 13 percent of non-US
market capitalization. Howell (1993) estimated that under various
assumptions, foreign capital flows into the emerging markets will be
between US$13 billion and US$27 billion annually during dae period
1992-2010 (Table 5). This is a staggering amount of resources that
can substantially relax the capital constraint, which many developing
countries currently face.
Although there is so much optimism in the air about the
sustainability of capital inflows, particularly portfolio investment, into
the developing countries in the next two decades, much is demanded
from developing countries in terms Of good macroeconomic
management and expansion of their absorptive capacities so that the},
can realize and fully maximize the benefits from the expected capital
inflows. This is because foreign capital inflows, irrespective of form,
beget some macroeconomic imbalances that can be magnified, if not
2. Greenwood (1993) found a positive correlation in the long term between
economic growth and stock market returns.LAMBERTE: MANAGING SURGES IN CAPITAL INFLOWS 51
Table 4
ESTIMATED PENSION ASSETS IN MAJOR MARKETS, 1990-2000
(In US$ billion)
% of % of Projected
Country 1990 Total 2000 total growth rate
(%)




Canada 165 4 425 4 10
Corporate 60 35
Public 105 65
United Kingdom 460 11 1,200 11 10
Corporate 320 70
Public 140 30
Continental EC 415 10 1,300 13 12
Corporate n/a n/a
Public n/a n/a
Japan 965 24 3,000 28 12
Corporate 24,5 25
Public 720 75
TOTAL 4,005 100 10,625 100 10
Source:Davanzoand Katz(1992).
properly handled, and can negate initial gains realized by capital-
receiving countries. The theoretical underpinning of this statement
is well-laid down in Corbo and Hernandez (1993).
Capital inflows tend to increase liquidity in the system, which
brings down domestic interest rates, which, in turn, stimulate domestic
expenditures. Part of the increased level of domestic expenditures
will go to the tradable goods and another part to the nontradable
goods. Expenditures on tradable goods enlarge the trade balancetj1 Tabie 5 to
FUTUR E FLOWS--REQUIRED NET CROSS-BORDER PURCHASES




1992A 1995E 2000E 2010E multiple net p.a.*
World market capitalization 10,257 13,652 21,987 57,028 5.6
* Emerging markets 607
as % of world total 5.9
Investors' holdings of foreign equitLes 903 1342 2541 8554 9.5
as % of world market cap 8.8 9.8 11.6 15.0
LOW ESTIMATE
Investors' holdings of emerging market
equities assuming 10% target exposure 86 129 247 855 9.9 13 c.n
as % of total foreign equities 9.5 9:6 9.7 10,0 z
as % of emerging market cap** 14.2 21,3 40.7 140.9 t- O
HIGH ESTIMATE -n "O
investors' holdings of emerging market __.
equities assuming 20% target exposure 86 151 360 1711 19.9 27
as a % of total foreign equities 9.5 11.3 14.2 20.0 -3-0
as % of emerging market cap** 1.4.2 24.9 59,3 281.9 m
E3
m
* Assuming that 70 percent of the increase comes from capital gains and 30 percent from net new money, m <
as over the 1986-1992 period.
** Based on current market capitalization. _.
m
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deficit, which party accommodates the foreign capital inflows. On
the other hand, expenditures on nontradable goods result in an excess
demand for nontradable goods at the existing relative price. This
calls for an adjustment in the relative price in favor of nontradables
to clear the market, which amounts to a real exchange rate
appreciation. This, in turn, results in a reallocation of resources in
favor of the nontradable sector. As Corbo and Hernandez pointed
out, the final result of this adjustment "is a real. appreciation, a larger
nontradable sector, a smaller tradable sector, and a larger trade
balance deficit." This, in effect, is the process of de-industrialization.
Although the price mechanism is atwork to clear the market, the
growing trade balance deficit may not be sustainable, especially if it
is financed by portfolio investments, which are viewed to be more
reversible than loans and direct foreign investments. Certain
disturbances in tile international capital market (e.g., a rise in interest
rates in developed economies) or in the domestic economy of
developing countries could quickly send capitals back to their
respective home countries, especially under a deregulated foreign
exchange market. Moreox_er, the volatility of portfolio investment
would create more instability in domestic inflation and interest rates
as well as in nominal and real exchange rates. Thus, it is argued that,
when faced by rapid capital inflows, governments must intervene to
smooth fluctuations in the real exchange rates and interest rates and
in economic activity in general to avoid a balance-of-payments crisis.
The cost of nonintervention could be high. The resulting real
exchange rate appreciation could undermine the credibility of the
exporboriented trade reforms already initiated by developing
countries. On the other hand, the molletization of th.e inflows could
lead to the loss of monetary control under a fixed exchange rate
regime.
Williamson (1993) listed the tollowing possible intervention
measures that could be adopted by countries that are experiencing
surges in foreign capital inflows:54 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
• Encouragement of unsterilized intervention which will also result
in the transfer being accomplished, though with a delay and with
inflation rather than nominal appreciation producing the real
appreciation;
• Pursuance ofa contractionary fiscal policy, so as to reduce internal
absorption and permit a reduction in interest rates that will reduce
the incentive for an inflow of capital;
• Maintainance of controls on capital inflows, (e.g., variable deposit
requirements against foreign borrowings) that can be resorted
to when inflows become excessive;
• Engagement in sterilized intervention in an attempt to resist the
transfer, with the risk that the market will ultimately overwhelm
this attempt;
• Manipulation of the flow of domestic liquidity into the banking
system using excess government savings, which may be regarded
as a generalized form of sterilized intervention;
• Widening of band of permissible exchange rate fluctuations, so
as to allow a temporary appreciation without undermining the
confidence of exporters that tim exchange rate will remain
competitive in the medium term; and
• Elimination of any remaining subsidies to inward im,estment, such
as fl_ee deposi t insurance.
In practice, all countries that experienced surges in foreign capital
inflows, particularly portfolio investment, have intervened to reduce,
if not entirely eliminate, the unwanted effects of such inflows. As
shown in Table 6, countries adopted certain measures in combination
with other measures. However, not all of them were adopted at. the
same time. Some were introduced later to reinforce the desired effects
of measures instituted earlier, while others were deemphasized despite
continued capital inflows.Table 6
MAJOR ECONOMfC MEASURES USED BY SAMPLE COUNTRIES ._,
CO
Mexico Chile Colombia Korea Indonesia Malaysia
m.








Fiscalrestraint(inclusive of yes yes yes yes yes -n
payingpublicforeign debt) m _
CO
Sterilization throughopen yes yes yes yes yes C'>
marketoperation _,
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Most countries conducted aggressive sterilized intervention as the
first line of defense against sudden, large capital inflows. However, as
foreign capital continued to rise, sterilized intervention was de-
emphasized for three reasons: (1) it involved high quasi-fiscal costs;
(9) it quickly led to higher domestic interest rates, thereby attracting
more short-term capital; and (3) it did not have potential benefits in
terms of higher investment and growth which a less aggressive stance
could generate_ As Schadler et al. (1993) pointed out:
Sterilization -- narrowly defined as the exchange of bonds for
foreign exchange -- is often effective in insulating an economy for
short periods from some of the unwanted effects of surges in inflows.
It is easy to implement quickly and, for several of the counu'ies
reviewed, appears to have prevented a widening of the current
account deficit while locking in large increases in official reserves
that limited countries' vulnerability to a reversal of the inflows. It
appears to have been less effective in securing inflation targets and
preventing real appreciations -- probably owing to the large role of
credibility and inflation expectations in these developments.
Countries that sterilized most aggressively benefited least from the
effects of inflows on investment and growth. Thus, aggressive
sterilization is not appropriate when structural and fiscal changes
that raise the profitability of investment are an important cause .of
the inflows.
Corbo and Hernandez share the same conclusions. They warn
that the growing quasi-fiscal deficit of the Central Bank arising from
its sterilized intervention can be the subject of speculative attack.
One issue that has been raised is the role of the fiscal sector in
minimizing the effect of the surge in foreign capital inflows on the
real exchange rate. if the government finances its purchases of the
foreign exchange in the market through bond issuance, then it willLAMBERTE: MANAGING SURGES INCAPITAL INFLOWS 57
suffer the same fate as the Central Bank, which conducts sterilized
intervention. It therefore suggests that the only way to avoid a real
exchange appreciation resulting from the surges in capital inflows is
for the fiscal sector to generate a surplus. However, this may be difficult
to do, especially if the country lags far behind in infrastructure that
is badly needed to expand its absorptive capacity. In their study,
Schadler et al. (1993) found that "fiscal adjustment did not figure
significantly in most countries' responses to inflows." However, this is
not a prescription for having a loose fiscal policy.
III
DEALING WITH SURGES IN CAPITAL INFLOWS:
THE PHILIPPINE CASE
The surge in capital inflows currently being experience d by the
Philippines is a result of external and internal factors. Since most of
the external factors have already been discussed, this section, will
focus on the internal factors that lead to a surge in capital inflows. It
will also discuss the characteristics of the capital inflows and the
measures adopted by the government to deal with the undesirable
side-effects generated by the surge in capital inflows.
Major Reforms
Credibility in instituting economic reforms attracts the attention
of fbreign investors. This seems to be the biggest factor in attracting
foreign capital into the country.
The government introduced major reforms in almost all areas of
the economy during the period 1986-94 to improve the general
economic environment, change the structure of the economy toward
a more efficient and internationally competitive one, and build a
firmer foundation for sustained growth. In the trade sector, the
Philippines undertook a unilateral trade liberalization. Between 198658 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
and 1993, the number of regulated items was reduced from 1,924
items to 183. In 1991, the government embarked on a five-year tariff
reduction. By 1995, the Philippines will have instituted a nine-band
tariff structure, with items concentrated at 3, 10, 20 and 50 percent
tariffs. Recently, tariff reductions in textiles, garments, and the
industry's chemical inputs were accelerated.
In the fiscal sector, tax reforms were initiated in the second half
of the 1980s to improve the elasticity oft_he tax system, promote equity
by ensuring that similarly situated individuals and firms bore the same
tax burden, promote growttl by withdrawing or modifying taxes that
impair incentives to produce, improve tax administration by
simplifying the tax system, and promote tax compliance. One
significant tax reform was the adoption of the Value Added Tax (VAT)
that replaced several sales taxes. The expanded VAT system will soon
be implemented by the government.
In the financial markets, the government promoted competition
by removing controls on interest rates, rationalizing the government
credit programs so as not to compete wifla private financial institutions,
privatizing several government-controlled banks, and liberalizing the
entry of new domestic banks and bank branching. Recently, a law
was passed liberalizing the entry and scope of operations of foreign
banks. Selective credit control was abandoned de facto when the
Central Bank started to impose a uniform rediscounting policy for
all economic activities.
The significant institutional reforms initiated in the financial
markets include: (1) the creation of an independent Central Bank,
(the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas), which is free from the burden of
huge losses incurred by its predecessor; (2) the rehabilitation and
strengthening o£ government-owned specialized banks; (3) the
rehabilitation of the rural banking system; and (4) the weeding out
of weak private commercial banks through closure, consolidation or
merger. The new Central Bank Act strengthens the authority of the
BSP to institute prudential regulations.LAMBERTE:MANAGING SURGES IN CAPITALINFLOWS 59
In the foreign exchange market, a substantial number of exchange
controls such as the surrender requirement for export proceeds, prior
BSP approval for export transactions, and payment on any forex
transactions and for capital repatriation/dividend/interest remittance
privilege have been removed in the last four years. Filipino nationals
working overseas are no longer required to remit specified minimum
shares of their earnings. However, some restrictions still remain with
respect to foreign borrowing by private and public sectors, especially
those guaranteed by the national government or government financial
institutions.
At present, the exchange rate is freely determined in the market.
The Bankers Association of the Philippines set up the Philippine
Dealing System, which links participants through an electronic screen-
based network for sharing information and undertaking foreign
exchange transactions.
Four major policy reforms that have a direct bearing on capital
market development have been introduced. First, the double taxation
of dividend income was eliminated through the abolition of the tax
on intercorporate dividends and the gradual phaseout of thetax on
shareholder's dividend income. Second, the SEC formally issued in
October 1989 the "Rules and Regulations Governing Investment
Companies," signalling the revival of mutual funds. Third, as part of
the foreign exchange deregulation program, rules and regulations
covering foreign investments in Central Bank-approved securities have
been relaxed. Under the new rules, some of the functions of the
Central Bank have been dowrdoaded to the custodian banks to reduce
red tape. This means that a foreign investor can now immediately
invest in CB-approved securities, unlike before when he would have
waited several weeks for Central Bank approval. Foreign investments
duly registered with the Central Bank or with a custodian bank duly
designated by the foreign investor are now entitled to full and
immediate capital repatriation. Without prior Central Bank approval,
an authorized agent bank may sell and remit the equivalent foreign60 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
exchange representing sales/divestment proceeds or dividends/
interest of duly registered foreign investment. While waiting for
reinvestment or repatriation, divestment proceeds of duly registered
foreign investment as well as cash dividends, interest payments and
divestment proceeds of stock dividends/splits may be lodged in
interest earning deposits, whereas before they were allowed to be
placed only in government securities, shares of stock of BOI-registered
industries, and shares of stock in CB-certified export-oriented
industries with prior Central Bank approval. Brokers have pointed
out that transactions related to foreign investment in CB-approved
securities can now be settled in three to four days compared to four
to six months under the old rules and regulations. Fourth, the two
stock exchanges in the Philippines have recently been unified, thereby
eliminating some inefficiencies (e.g., price arbitrage) in the stock
market by having two stock exchanges listing the same shares. All
this facilitates the inflow of portfolio investment into the country.
As regards foreign investment, a foreign investment actwas passed
in 1991. It liberalizes the entry of foreign investors within the
provisions of the Philippine Constitution. As a general rule, there
are no restrictions on the extent of ownership of export enterprises
(defined as those exporting at least 60 percent of their output). As
for enterprises oriented to the domestic market, foreigners are allowed
to invest as much as 100 percent, unless the participation is prohibited
or limited to a smaller percentage by existing laws and/or the
provisions of the foreign investment act.
As part of its competition policy, the government dismantled entry
barriers that protected incumbent firms in key industries, such as
telecommunications, land, sea and air transport., banking, and
cement. This was complemented by an aggressive privatization
program. In 1993 alone, the government privatized 19 government-
owned or controlled corporations including several large ones, such
as Petron, Philippine Shipyard and Engineering Corp., and Oriental
Petroleum and Minerals Corp.LAMBERTE: MANAGINGSURGES IN CAPITAL INFLOWS 61
The reforms took time to yield positive results because of political
uncertainty and major natural calamities during the period 1986-
1990 which diverted much of the attention and resources of the
country away from long-term structural issues. These reforms are far
from being complete. In fact, the government is currently formulating
several reform measures to reinforce and intensify further the reforms
already put in place. For instance, the government has created a task
force to formulate a program of rationalizing further the tax and
fiscal incentive system to improve resource mobilization and, at the
same time, reduce, ifnot eliminate, distortions created by the existing
tax and fiscal incentive system. The progress in these reforms, albeit
slow in some areas, lends credibility to the reforms.
External Shocks
Perhaps, what makes the Philippines different from other
countries experiencing surges in capital inflows is that the foreign
exchange inflows came from both the capital account and the
nonmerchandise component of the current account which exerted
pressure on money supply and the exchange rate.
Capital account. Foreign capital inflows increased rapidly, both in
absolute terms and as a percentage of GNP from 1986 through the
first semester of 1994, except the years 1990 and 1992 (Table 7). In
1993, capital inflows amounted to about 4 percent of GNP, which is
well above the 0.3 percent of GNP in 1986. Direct investments
provided much of the impetus up until 1989. Thereafter, medium-
and long-term loans contributed a significant amount to the capital
inflows as the government intensified its efforts to secure bilateral
and multilateral official development assistance. This was also
bolstered by the successful issuance of medium-term bonds by some
government and private corporations in the international markets
in 1993, amounting to US$865 million. This is important to the
Philippines since it signals the return of the country to theO3
PO
Table 7
CAPITAL ACCOUNT, NET FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
AND MEDIUM- AND LONG-TERM LOANS
(In US$ million)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
(1st sere.)
Capital account 81,00 421.00 643.00 1518,00 1492.00 1794.00 837.00 2244.00 2104100




Net 140.00 326,00 986.00 843.00 480.00 654.00 736.00 612.00 783.00 z
% of GNP 0.5 1,0 2,6 2.0 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.1 2.6 >r-
Medium- and 0
long-term -r-°
loans, net 732.00 t59.00 -519.00 381.00 406,00 922,00 480.00 2105,00 674.00 _..E
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international private capital market. All this suggests that a large
component of the recent surges in foreign capital inflows into the
Philippines are medium- and long-term capitals, which cannot be
quickly reversed in the short term.
The two important components of direct investments are net new
investments (i.e., new foreign investments minus capital withdrawn
from the Philippines) and net portfolio investments (i.e., portfolio
investment inflows minus portfolio investment outflows). Net new
foreign investments were either close to zero Ornegative during the
period 1986-94 (Table 8). In fact, they were severely negative in the
last three years. In contrast, net portfolio investment increased
dramatically from US$13 million in 1986 to US$855 million in 1993,
or from close to zero percent to 1.7 percent of GNE The figures for
the first semester of ]994 seem to suggest that net portfolio investment
will have another significant increase for the entire year. The sudden
surge in net portfolio investment occurred in 1989, the year when
the First Philippine Fund was listed in the New York Stock Exchange.
Itwas not, however, sustained in the next two years because of political
and economic instability, brought about by the failed coup d'etat in
December 1989, the series of major calamities that struck the country,
and the Gulf War. The return to political stability starting in 1991
and the expected recovery of the economy in succeeding years as a
result of the reforms attracted more portfolio investment. There is
no question that the return of the Philippines to the international
private capital markets helped attract portfolio investments to the
country.
There were other factors that facilitated the surge in net portfolio
investment in the last three years. One was the huge differential
between domestic and foreign interest rates (Figure 1). Although
the interest rate differential has been declining since 1991, it is still
large by international standards, especially since the peso has been
generally appreciating vis-a-vis the dollar in the most recent past.Table 8
NET DIRECT INVESTMENTS, NET PORTF©L10 INVESTMENTS
AND NET NEW FOREIGN INVESTMENTS
(In US$ million)
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
(1st Sere.)
Net direct
investments 140,00 326.00 986.00 843.00 480.00 654.00 736.00 612.00 783.00 {,_
% of GNP 0,5 1.0 2.6 2.0 1.1 1.4 1.3 1.1 2.6 O
Net portfolio z _
investments 13.00 19.00 50.00 372.00 152.00 212.00 451.00 855.00 663.00 r-
% of GNP 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.9 0.3 0.5 0.8 1.7 2.2 m O
Net new foreign -o i
investments -18.00 24.00 7.00 -2.00 -33.00 28.00 -177.00 -772.00 -348.00
% of GNP -0.1 -0.1 0.0 0.00 -0.1 0.1 -0.3 -1.4 -1.t -o
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Another factor was the attractive rate of return on stocks. 'Ybafiez
(1992) analyzed rates of return of various financial assets during the
period November 1986 - March 1992 and found that common stocks
yielded the highest after-tax real rates of return in the Philippine
financial markets, followed by TreasuryBills, time deposits and savings
deposits in that order (Table 9).
Remittances and withdrawals of FCDU deposits. Two items in the
nonmerchandise trade of the balance of payments that contributed
large foreign exchange inflows into the country are remittances of
Filipino overseas workers and withdrawals of foreign currency deposit
unit (FCDU) deposits. Although the level of overseas workers'
remittances was already high and gradually growing in absolute terms
in the second half of the 1980s, it increased rapidly in 1990d992,
both in absolute terms and as a percentage of GNP (Table 10). In
1993, remittances reached US$2.3 billion,which is equivalent to 4
percent of GNP. There were supply and demand factors that could
Table 9
REAL RATES OF RETURN (November 1986-March 1992)
(Inflation-adjusted; in percent)
Monthly Annual
Arithmetic Standard Geometric Arithmetic
Series mean deviation mean mean
Common stocks 1.36 12.60 0.60 21.5
Commercial-industrial 1.21 10.81 0.62 21.7
Mining -0.31 13.13 -1.10 0.3
Oil 3.41 21.60 1.50 43.7
Treasury bills 0.27 0.63 0.27 4.1
Time deposits 0.11 0.71 0.11 2.0
Savings deposits -0.54 0.77 -0.54 -5.6




REMITTANCES AND WITHDRAWALS FROM FCDUs m




1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 . 1994
(1stsere.)
Remittances 696.00 809.00 874.00 1002.00 1203.00 1649.00 2222.00 2276.00 1269.00 -o
% of GNP 2.4 2.5 2.3 2.4 2.7 3.6 4.t 4.0 4.2 _'
Withdrawals of
FCDU deposits 418.00 379,00 435.00 690°00 643.00 866.00 1263.00 1680.00 1432.00 r-
% of GNP 1.4 1.2 1.2 1.6 1.4 1.9 2.3 3.0 4.7
Source:BangkoSentralng Pilipinas. u_68 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
explain this. On the demand side, the rapid growth of the country's
Asian neighbors in the 1990s created a large demand for highly skilled
workers (e.g., engineers, architects and accountants) and middle-level
managers. This was complemented by the opening up of
nontraditional labor markets (e.g., Taiwan, Korea) for Filipino
semiskilled workers. Thus, in a way, the Philippines has benefited
from the rapid economic growth enjoyed by its Asian neighbors. On
the supply side, the lackluster performance of the Philippine economy
in the last decade has encouraged Filipino workers to look for better
paying jobs abroad. It cannot be denied that recent financial
innovations in banking have facilitated the transmittal of contract
workers earnings through the banking system in a more efficient
manner 'than the traditional "padala" system.
Overseas workers' remittances will likely remain high in the
medium term, but are not expected to increase as dramatically as in
1990-199_ for several reasons. First, there are already signs that
economic growth in the country's Asian neighbors is tapering off.
This will reduce their demand for additional semiskilled and skilled
workers and middle-level managers from other countries. Second,most
of the country's Asian neighbors have been investing heavily in human
resource development. Thus, in the near future, homegrown talents
are going to replace or reduce demand for Filipino workers. And
third, sustained growth in the Philippines expected in the medium
term will likely reduce the incentives for Filipino workers to look for
jobs abroad.
Withdrawals of FCDU deposits rose sharply, both in absolute terms
and as a percentage of GNP, beginning in 1991, the year when foreign
exchange markets deregulation begun. In 1993, these amounted to
US$1.7 billion, or 3 percent of GNP. The sources of these funds were,
however, unclear. Part of them must have come from the earnings of
Filipino overseas workers that were not declared as such and deposited
directly in their FCDU accounts. It is to be noted that, with foreignLAMBERTE. MANAGINGSURGES IN CAPITALINFLOWS 69
exchange deregulation, overseas workers are no longer required to
remit a certain portion of their earnings to local banks. Anybody
may open an FCDU account and deposit foreign currency in cash or
check in such an account. Further, exporters must have started using
the FCDU facility when they were no longer required to surrender
their export receipts to the banking system. The other part of all
these could be flight capital returning home or cash personally
brought in by small foreign investors and temporarily placed in FCDU
accounts. This suggests that withdrawals of FCDU deposits contain
some inflows that can be reversed later when economic circumstances
in the Philippines are no longer favorable either for short-term or
long-term investment.
Interestingly, both workers' remittances and withdrawals of FCDU
deposits are at least twice as large as the net portfolio investment
(Figure 2).
Some issues. Several issues have been raised with respect to foreign
exchange inflows, particularly portfolio investment. One is that these
inflows are very volatile. A look at Figure 2, confirms observe that
there is some truth to this, particularly in the case of withdrawals of
FCDU deposits and portfolio investments. But the evidence so far
seems to show that their volatility stems from the economic and
political uncertainty of the country toward December 1989, rather
than from external factors. This suggests that, so long as the
fundamentals are right, foreign exchange inflows into the country
from both portfolio investment and withdrawals of FCDU deposits
will continue,
Another issue is that if portfolio investment mostly goes to the
local stock market, then its sheer magnitude can swamp the shallow
local stock market and cause some volatility in the stock market price.
Figure 3 shows that there is a very close relationship between stock
composite price index and net portfolio investments. The results ofFigure 2 o
REMITTANCES, WITHDRAWALS FROM FCDUs AND NET PORTFOLIO INVESTMENTS
(As percentage of GNP)
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our causality test using quarterly data for the period 1986.1-1994.2
indicate that net portfolio investment Granger affects the stock
composite price index? In particular, 86 percent of the variation in
the composite stock price index is explained by the variation in the
net portfolio investment. Thus, these results confirm the hypothesis
that volatility in the net portfolio investment causes volatility in the
stock market price index, at least in the Philippine context. However,
this should not alarm us for at least two reasons. One is that foreign
investors share the risk arising from the volatility in stock market
price. It is to be noted that a depression in the stock market price
does not automatically translate into a loss of foreign exchange
reserves unless the sale of shares of foreign investors is matched by
the purchases of local residents. 4 Another reason is that as long as
the country is able to sustain growth in a stable manner, net portfolio
investment will become less volatile.
An interesting issue that is perhaps worth looking into in greater
detail is whether portfolio investment is productively placed. If
portfolio investment is placed in existing shares of stocks, then it will
result in asset inflation, adding nothing to productive investment. In
3. The F-statistics for a one-quarter lag are as follows: 5.85 (prob. = 0.02) for the null
hypothesis that stock price is not Granger caused by net portfolio investment and
0.65 (prob. = 0.42) for the alternative hypothesis. Other lags were tested but showed
inferior results.
4. McCarthy, a fund manager of one of the biggest Singaporean banks, put forward
the following: '_Ne may ask ourselves What happens if FPC (i.e., foreign portfolio
capital) investors sell their shares and rush for the door at the same time? Could this
deal a blow to the economy? Actually, we can set our minds at rest for the effect on
the Philippines would be minimal. FPC funds invested in the stockmarket become a
permanent part of the economy, the plant and machinery has beenpaid for and is
perfectly safe. Funds cannot be directly withdrawn directly, instead investors must
exchange their paper certificates for cash, provided they can find a counterpart),. It
is the investors who lose for stock prices take the strain often dropping sharply,
sometimes the currency goes too and the investor gets hit both ways. But we go into
the trade with both eyes wide open; perfectly aware that it is we who bear the
repayment and repatriation risks" (1994, p. 7).LAMBERTE: MANAGINGSURGES IN CAPITALINFLOWS 73
the last four years, however, the market has witnessed a number of
IPOs raising large amount of capital. Capital raised in the last four
years tended to increased as net portfolio investment inflows increased
(Figure 4). This suggests that a significant amount of capital raised in
the market came from portfolio investment inflows.
To verify whether various types of foreign exchange inflows
described above have been used to increase productive investment
or consumption, we have regressed gross domestic capital formation
and personal consumption from the national income account series
on net portfolio investment, withdrawals of FCDU deposits,
remittances and deposits (savings plus time deposits). The last variable
serves as a proxy for domestic savings. All variables are expressed as a
percentage of nominal GNE The results shown in Table 11 indicate
that portfolio investment and domestic savings have a statistically
significant positive effect on investment ratio, whereas withdrawals
of FCDU deposits and remittances do not have a statistically significant
effect. On the other hand, remittances have a statistically positive
effect on personal consumption. Still, withdrawals of FCDU deposits
do not show any significant effect on personal consumption,
suggesting that this foreign exchange inflow contains the two
components previously mentioned. These results have at least two
policy implications. One is that the Philippines should welcome
portfolio investment because it is used to expand the country's
productive capacity. The other is that, while the country welcomes
more remittances, it should not rely on them to finance the expansion
of the country's productive capacity because they are used primari!y
for consumption purposes.
Responses of the Government
The surge in portfolio investments, overseas workers;remittances
and withdrawals of FCDU deposits, particularly after the liberalization
of the foreign exchange markets in 1991 and other reforms initiatedFigure 4 ._.
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Table11
EFFECTS OF PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT,WITHDRAWALSFROM FCDUs,















Sample period (quarterly) 1986,1 - 1994.2
* Significant at 1% level.
** Significantat 5% level,
*** Significant at 10% level.
All variables are expressed as percentage of GNP,The equations were estimated
using the Iterative Seemingly Unrelated Regressionstechnique.
by the government in the 1990s exerted pressure on the exchange
rate to appreciate. From P28 to one US dollar in the first quarter of
1991, the peso appreciated to P25.4 in 1993. Though itwas subjected
to a strong speculative attack in the third quarter of 1993, it
appreciated thereafter. Recendy, it has shown some signs of stability
at P24 to US$1.
The government's response to the persistent nominal
appreciation of the peso can be categorized into four types, namely:
reducing the supply of foreign exchange inflows; increasing the76 JOURNAL OF PHILIPPINE DEVELOPMENT
demand for foreign exchange; strengthening prudential regulations;
and reducing the cost of production for exporters.
To reduce the supply of foreign exchange in the country, the
government cut back on its requests for loan rescheduling under the
Paris Club debt program. It is presently planning to prepay some of
its foreign debt. Meanwhile, the BSP has lifted the restriction on the
repatriation of foreign investments made under the debt-to-equity
conversion program, as well as on the remittance of dividends, profits
and earnings that are derived from such investments. It also increased
the allowable outward investments that can be sourced from the
banking system from US$1 million to US$6 million per investor per
year.
To increase the demand for foreign exchange, the BSP has
engaged in sterilized intervention. That is, the BSP buys dollars in
the marketwhile at the same time engaging in mopping up operations
by selling government securities in its portfolio to prevent the money
supply from increasing. From January 1991 to September 1994, the
BSP had already bought US$6.6 billion dollars from the market. For
its part, the national government has advanced the phasedown of
the forward exchange cover extended to oil firms to December 1994
to add to the demand for foreign exchange.
The BSP instituted several measures to reduce the costs of
production to exporters to maintain their competitiveness. Direct
and indirect exporters have been allowed access to foreign currency
loans offered by FCDUs. This has afforded exporters large savings in
interest payments for their loans since interest rate differentials
between FCDU loans and peso-denominated loans from commercial
banks range from 5.5 to 7 percentage points. The BSP rediscount
rate has also been reduced from 14.3 percent in 1993 to 8.304 percent
in October 1994. Recently, the BSP planned on creating a special
dollar facility for exporters using part of its international reserves,
with domestic commercial banks serving as lending conduits. TheLAMBI::RTE:MANAGING SURGES IN CAPITAL INFLOWS 77
lending rate in this facility will be comparable with that of FCDU
loans.
To add more loanable funds to the system, the BSP gradually
reduced the reserve requirement on all deposit liabilities from 24
percent in January 1993 to 17 percent in August 1994. This has
contributed to the decline in domestic interest rates.
To prevent banks from unduly speculating in the foreign exchange
markets, the BSP reduced the oversold position of banks from 15
percent of its unimpaired capital to 5 percent. To weed out the
speculative component of portfolio investment, the BSP imposed a
prior BSP approval requirement on all forward transactions with
nonresidents.
Most of these measures have been implemented recently, and it
may take some time for their effects to be felt in the economy.
Howevei, the measures to reduce supply and increase demand for
foreign exchange would likely be less meaninfial if the BSP continued
to sterilize its intervention in the foreign exchange market. Figure 5
clearly shows that the BSP almost completely sterilized the monetary
effects of its purchases of dollars from the market by changing net
domestic assets in a direction opposite to the change in net foreign
assets by ahnost tile same amount. But is sterilization policy effective
in the Philippine context?
It is well known that under a fixed exchange rate regime, a
sterilization policy is less effective if the economy is more open and
there is a greater degree of substitution between donlestic and foreign
assets. We have verified this in the case of the Philippines by estimating
an offset coefficient. An offset coefficient close to -1.0 indicates a
higher degree of substitution between domestic and foreign assets,
which means that the BSP's sterilization policy will be ineffective.
The result is shown in 'Fable 12. The estimated offset coefficient is-
0.88, which is very high and close to one. _The result suggests that
5. Schadler et al.'s (1993) estimates of offset coefficients for other countries range
from - 0,1 to -0.7, the highest being that of Thailand.Figure5
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Sampleperiod (quarterly) 1988.1- 1994.2
* Significant at 1% level.
** Significant at 10% level.
the sterilization policy of the BSP is less effective because rely reducdon
in net domestic assets, which is a policy variable, induces all increase
in net foreign assets by an almost equal amount.
Indeed, the sterilized intervention of the BSP failed to arrest the
persistent nominal appreciation of the peso as more foreign capital
flowed in to cash in on the huge differential between domestic and
foreign interest rates. As Figure 6 suggests, the behavior of money
supply moves closely with the exchange rate; that is, the peso
appreciates if monetary policy is tightened.
While nobody contests the need to have a prudent monetary
policy, the consensus is that, it must be coordinated with fiscalpolicy.
The fiscal sector has lately been successful in conducting a prudent
fiscal policy, thus, government consumption as a ratio to GNP has
been declining of late (Figure 7). Also, the consolidated public sector
deficit has been contained (Figure 8). As of 14 November 1994, the,_O_B_....t-
Figure 7 :>
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national government, which was expecting a deficit of about P7 billion,
had instead realized a fiscal surplus of P21.8 billion. This should have
already given monetary policy some room for flexibility. On the
contrary, monetary policy was even tightened further in the most
recent past to meet monetary targets under the IMF stabilization
program. This prevented the domestic interest rate from going down
to further cut the differential between domestic and foreign interest
rates. This, in turn, attracted more portfolio investment which has
exerted more pressure on the peso to appreciate.
It must be borne in mind that sterilized intervention involves a
huge quasi-fiscal cost. Given a difference of 5 percentage points
between the domestic and international interest rates, sterilized
intervention in the foreign exchange market will cost the BSP about
US$0.33 billion in 1994. Others have argued that quasi-fiscal losses
from sterilization are greatly exaggerated because the Central Bank
can recoup part of the interest losses from sterilization when the
currency depreciates. However, under the new Central Bank Act of
the Philippines, any excess profit or loss arising from the revaluation
of reserves will be booked in special frozen accounts and cannot be
reflected in the income statement.
The positive point, however, is that BSP's purchases of foreign
exchange allowed it to build up its gross international reserves which
increased from US$2 billion in 1990 (equivalent to 1.5 months of
imports of goods and services) to US$7.5 billion in June 1994
(equivalent to 3.5 months of imports of goods and services). However,
the cost of building up those reserves could have been less had ttle
BSP not flflly sterilized its intervention in the market.oo
Figure 9 -_
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IV
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The Philippines is currently experiencing a rapid deterioration in
the balance of trade. (Figure 9). Despite this, the peso has been
generally appreciating vis-a-vis the US dollar because of the large
foreign exchange inflows coming from remittances, withdrawals of
FCDU deposits and capital account, which more than cover the trade
balance deficit. Portfolio investment inflow is likely to be sustained
in the medium term so long as the economy achieves a modest, stable
growth. There are strong indications that these portfolio investments
will be translated into real productive investments. However, the
country is, to a large extent, being denied the benefits of these inflows
because of inappropriate monetary policy. Despite the recent
tightening of fiscal policy, monetarypolicy likewise continues to be
tight to meet monetary targets under the IMF-sponsored stabilization
program. Indeed, the tight monetary and fiscal policies caved in on
the Philippine economy, exerting pressure on the nominal exchange
rate to appreciate.
Since 1991, the Philippines' real effective exchange rate has been
rising (Figure 10). In contrast, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand,
which have experienced similar surges in capital inflows, successfully
avoided the appreciation of their real effective exchange rates. Clearly,
the Philippines' export competitiveness is fading, with the de-
industrialization of the economy becoming a real threat. Banks that
have significant exposure to the export sector will soon encounter
financial problems, unless tl_e current trend is reversed.
The study, therefore, calls for a relaxation of monetary policy to
accommodate the additional demand for money arising from foreign
exchange inflows. Under a persistent capital inflow, it would be better
for the BSP to change the monetary target from base money to net
domestic assets to cash in on the capital inflows.LAMBERTE: MANAGING SURGESINCAPITAL INFLOWS 87
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